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The crisis of the 1980s was preceded in Peru by five 
years of economic stagnation which accentuated its 
effects. Gross investment fell sharply, as did indus-
trial and farm production and construction. How-
ever, this fall was due mainly to activities connected 
with domestic demand, for activities responding to 
the international market did not have the same 
results. 
Against this background the author analyses the 
financial evolution of enterprises in the period 1980-
1985. He shows that although the financial situation 
of productive enterprises deteriorated rapidly, they 
managed to transmit to other sectors a large part of 
this deterioration. This did not produce widespread 
bankruptcies, despite the sharp drop in sales at the 
beginning of the crisis. On the one hand, there was a 
decline in real wages and in the relative prices of 
industrial sector inputs. On the other hand, enter-
prises deferred and reduced their tax payments and 
the service of their debts, with the result that the 
doubtful debts ¡n the banks' portfolios reached 
unprecedented levels. The authorities abandoned the 
policy of positive real interest rates introduced in 
1981 and made it easier for enterprises to obtain 
refinancing loans. According to the author, busi-
nesses managed to withstand the crisis with surpris-
ing success, but their survival mechanisms had a high 
social cost and probably helped to aggravate the 
overall crisis. 
•The author was Chairman of the Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru. This study was prepared under the auspices 
of the Joint Project UNDP/IiCLAC RI.A/77/021 "Implica-
tions for Latin America of the Internationa! Monetary and 
Financial System". 
Introduction 
During the period 1980-1985 Peru, like the 
majority of the countries of the region, under-
went an economic crisis without precedent in 
this century. This crisis saw a drop of 16% in the 
gross domestic product and a doubling of the 
inflation rate from 60 to 120% a year in the first 
months of 1983. Real wages and salaries in mod-
ern activities fell by 40% between 1982 and 
1985, while the external public debt increased by 
44%. 
As in the rest of the region, in Peru the crisis 
was closely connected with the well-known 
external events of those years: world recession 
and sharp decline in raw materials prices, 
increase in world interest rates, protectionism, 
and closure of external financial markets. 
But there were two additional factors in the 
Peruvian crisis. The first was the El Niño ocean 
current, a dramatic phenomenon which caused a 
direct loss of 5% of the gross domestic product 
in 1983 and the effects of which exacerbated the 
effects of the crisis in the external sector during 
this period. 
The second factor was a consequence of 
events in the decade before the crisis. In Peru the 
recession of the 1980s was a continuation of a 
state of almost continuous financial and produc-
tive crisis since 1975. Unlike the rest of the 
region, Peru did not grow between 1975 and 
1979, and in this period the economy suffered a 
collapse of its traditional financiai stability and 
was further weakened by institutional changes 
and State intervention throughout the 1970s and 
especially in the period 1970-1975. The state of 
the economy at the end of the 1970s —beset as it 
was by distortions in the labour, land and capital 
markets and by an inflated and exceptionally 
inefficient public sector— probably reduced its 
adjustment capacity during the 1980s. 
What was the effect of this crisis on business 
debt? Was there a financial crisis in the private 
sector? How did the financial problems of enter-
prises affect the overall performance of the 
economy? 
An attempt will be made to answer these 
questions. Section I summarizes the aggregate 
economic performance to show the global con-
text in which businesses operated in that period. 
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Section II considers the financial performance of 
enterprises on the basis of their audited balances 
submitted annually to the National Supervisory 
Commission for Companies and Securities 
(CONASEV). Lastly, section III offers some 
interpretation of all this. 
1. Background (Î970-I978) 
It is difficult to understand the performance of 
business in the 1980s without a knowledge of 
what happened in the previous decade. 
The 1970s produced two negative factors for 
business. The first was the sharp increase in 
intervention and direct participation by the State 
in the economy (1970-1975). This dirigisme was 
accompanied by redistribuíive measures which 
smashed the rules of the game with respect to 
the domestic and foreign guarantees enjoyed by 
business. 
In this period the government imposed a 
drastic agrarian reform, the effects of which on 
business attitudes were due not only to the 
expropriation itself but also to the bureaucratic 
arbitrariness and political hostility with which 
the transfer was carried out. The ownership of 
industries and mines was affected by the Joint-
Ownership Law which transferred part of the 
profits to the workers and gave them a share in 
the management of the enterprise. There were 
at the time draft laws with the same objective for 
other sectors of activity, and although they were 
not promulgated the feeling of threat persisted. 
Business was also affected by the Labour Stability 
Law which made manpower cuts almost impos-
sible. Lastly, the government expropriated var-
ious activities and enterprises, mostly in foreign 
ownership, but including some Peruvian ones, as 
in the fishing industry for example. 
State intervention increased with the estab-
lishment of exchange rate and imports controls, 
as well as with the increased regulation of invest-
ment and other aspects of productive activity. 
It must be pointed out that generally speak-
ing the available statistics are limited and many 
of them unreliable. Furthermore, this topic has 
received little attention in the country. The 
material presented here is therefore extremely 
tentative in nature. 
The second negative factor occurred in the 
second half of the 1970s. From 1975 to 1978 
there was a period of acute macroeconomic 
instability in which inflation far exceeded its 
earlier levels of 10 to 20%. From 1975 to 1979 
inflation averaged 44% and relative prices, espe-
cially of items controlled by the government 
such as foreign exchange and fuel, underwent 
large and sudden changes. The Central Bank lost 
all its reserves and both access to foreign 
exchange and ¡ts price became extremely uncer-
tain for business, a situation which the country 
had not known since the 1940s. Production stag-
nated and at the end of the decade the per capita 
income was 5 % lower than in 1974. Throughout 
the 1970s investment, especially private sector 
investment, declined. 
The adverse effect of all this was offset in 
part by a recovery in the balance of payments in 
the last years of the decade. The volume of 
exports increased by 65% between 1975 and 
1979 when the oil pipeline from the northern 
forests and a large copper mine came into opera-
tion, and non-traditional exports increased from 
US$96 million in 1975 to US$845 million in 
1979. In addition, and by way of exception, 
export prices rose in 1979- The improvement in 
the balance of payments was also due to a sharp 
reduction in imports following the measures of 
fiscal austerity and monetary control of 1978-
1979- In those two years the gross domestic 
product began to recover at an annual rate of 
3%, despite the reduction in aggregate demand 
imposed by the stabilization programme. 
The balance of the 1970s was not favourable 
for the productive capacity. This capacity 
I 
Economic performance in 1970-1985 
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Table 1 
PERU: GROSS PRIVATE INVESTMENT," 
1950-1985 
















Source: Prepared on the basis of national accounts figures 
from the National Institute of Statistics (INE) and 
the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP). 
"Includes variations in stocks. Excludes public enterprises. 
declined under the cumulative effect of a decade 
of lower investment and as a result of the loss of 
business flexibility due to the various distortions 
in the factor and goods markets and to the sub-
jection of a large part of the economy to greater 
regulation and direct management by the 
bureaucracy. The experience of those years also 
affected the business outlook, reducing the wil-
lingness to invest in the country and increasing 
speculative operations. This trend was streng-
thened by chronic uncertainty about the availa-
bility of foreign exchange, by the possibility of 
using loans in the national currency at negative 
real interest rates, by the feeling of greater inse-
curity with respect to the rights of ownership 
and profits, and by the greater risks resulting 
from an unstable macroeconomic situation. All 
this increased the reluctance to risk investing 
own capital and therefore enhanced the relative 
advantage of borrowing, 
The effects of all this on business perfor-
mance can be summed up in the following statis-
tics on private investment and the probable 
flight of foreign exchange: the average annual 
rate of private investment for the decades 1950, 
1960 and 1970 was 17.7, 12.3 and 8% (table 1). 
The apparent decline in investment was accom-
panied by an apparent increase in the flight of 
foreign exchange: in the same decades the errors 
and omissions in the balance of payments were 
on average 0.6,0.8 and -1.1 % of the annual gross 
domestic product. 
2. Three and a half years of recovery: 
January 1979 to June 1982 
The 1970s closed with a number of swallows 
which seemed to be heralding summer. Between 
January 1979 and June 1982 the economy slowly 
recovered and it grew by 13% throughout the 
Table 2 
PERU: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY EXPENDITURE", 1980-1985 
















































































































Source: Prepared on the basis of information from the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP). 
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period, while inflation remained at a high but 
stable rate of 6 0 % a year. The shortage of for-
eign exchange for business disappeared with the 
exports boom of 1979-1980, and several mea-
sures were introduced to open up imports. The 
total demand increased with the higher wages of 
1980 and with the growth of public investment. 
The legal framework for owners seemed more 
reliable with the return of a democratic govern-
ment, which moreover tended towards the cen-
tre or centre-right. The government also aligned 
itself directly with the attitude of the second 
phase of the previous régime, moderating some 
of the reformist measures, in particular the one 
concerning labour stability. Furthermore, the 
increased supply of foreign exchange and the 
good relations with the IMF and the rest of the 
world financial system created expectations of 
less macroeconomic instability. 
But the promised summer did not come. 
Export prices began to fall in the first months of 
1980 and by June 1982 the index of the purchas-
ing power of traditional exports had lost half its 
January 1980 value. Confidence in the availabil-
ity of foreign exchange disappeared rapidly in 
the face of the external recession, the sharp 
increase in imports ( 4 1 % in three years) and the 
drop in reserves which began in the first months 
of 1981. 
The industrial sector suffered the joint 
impact of lower tariffs, higher exchange rates, 
openness measures, rapid expansion of overseas 
purchases by enterprises and State bodies which 
traditionally pay no customs duties, and smug-
gling stimulated by the laundering of the foreign 
currency generated by the drugs traffic, and by 
the dumping caused by the world recession. In 
1980-1981 the relative prices of industrial goods 
fell: the reduction was 2 8 % for the textiles and 
footwear sectors and 2 1 % for household 
appliances. The external sector acted as a strong 
depressive force through its -effects both on 
direct demand and on expectations. 
The growing fiscal deficit added to the wor-
ries about the future. On the other hand, the 
heavy inflow of external loans helped to main-
tain the level of international reserves, and the 
recovery of the world economy created hopes. In 
these circumstances business invested little, but 
there was a solid flow of return on capital from 
abroad which was invested mainly in foreign 
currency bank certificates. The growing uncer-
tainty about the future did not seem to affect this 
instrument of dollar savings. Private investment 
increased slightly from 1980 to 1982 (to 10.8% 
of GDP), but without reaching the levels of 1950-
1969 (table 1). 
3. Crisis; July 1982 to July 1985 
The last half of 1982 was a period of deepening 
recession, a result of the continuing decline in 
the value of exports and of the external competi-
Table 3 
PERU: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
BY ORIGIN" 





































































































































; of Statistics (INE). 
Includes the fisheries sector. 

























INTERNAL DEBT AND FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENT IN PERU / R. Webb 59 
Table 4 
PERU: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1978-1986* 





































































































































































































































Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
"Deseasonalized. 
Includes: agriculture, fisheries, mining, primary manufactures and non-traditional exports, where the output depends toa large extent on 
factors independent of domestic policy (mainly the position in world markets and the weather). 
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tion confronting the industrial sector. Despite a 
restrictive monetary programme —the Central 
Bank did not lend to the government— the 
expenditure capacity was maintained by means 
of heavy external borrowing, both public and 
private, increasingly in the form of short-term 
loans. However, much of this spending capacity 
was directed abroad, and almost all the produc-
tive sectors recorded declines in the second half 
of 1982. 
From the first months of 1983 the crisis took 
on a new dimension with the climatic disaster 
caused by the El Niño current. The loss of harv-
ests, mineral and oil shipments, fisheries, and 
certain manufactures and other light activities 
connected with the affected raw materials 
amounted to 5% of the national product. 
Moreover, the fiscal and monetary losses 
depressed industrial and commercial sales even 
further: public expenditure declined 7% in real 
terms (table 2). 
The business disaster was not limited to the 
collapse of sales; from the first months of 1983 
inflation rose to an annual three-digit rate, and 
relative prices began to undergo major changes 
especially with the faster devaluation, the reduc-
tion of subsidies for fuel and other controlled 
items, and the shortage of many farm goods. 
In the space of a year and a half (June 1982 to 
December 1983) industrial production fell 25%, 
farm production 17% and construction 19% 
(table 3). 
When these production losses are broken 
down it can be seen that the decline caused by the 
reduction of aggregate demand was greater than 
the production losses due to outside causes (the 
weather and the international recession). Dur-
ing those 18 months the real product of primary 
and export activities fell 14% (table 4). When 
the loss of real income connected with the terms 
of trade is included, the decline is 13%. How-
ever, in the rest of the economy (i.e., in indus-
trial, commercial and service activities where 
production responds better to demand in the 
short term) the reduction in the product was 
17%. 
This pattern was repeated in the manufac-
turing sector. The production of primary goods, 
mainly for export, fell 29% in the space of nine 
months owing to the weather (table 5). But the 
recovery was rapid; between January 1983 and 
Table 5 
PERU: VALUE ADDED IN MANUFACTURING: 
MANUFACTURE OF PRIMARY GOODS 


















































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP). 
"Includes the manufacture of non-ferrous basic metals, 
sugar, petroleum, fish meal and other fisheries products. 
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June 1985 production increased 31.3%. The rest 
of industry, which had much idle capacity from 
1983 or even 1982, grew by only 0.6% between 
December 1983 and June 1985. 
Another of the effects of the international 
recession and the weather problems was the 
decline in investment; private investment fell by 
35% in real terms in 1982-1983 and total invest-
ment by 29%. It can be seen that the internal 
component was larger than the external one in 
the recession in this period. 
The global situation underwent no substan-
tial change in the following 18 months, i.e., until 
the introduction of the radically different eco-
nomic programme imposed by the government 
in July 1985. Production in the primary sectors 
and in other sectors where supply does not 
depend on domestic demand made a full recov-
ery during 1984, but the rest of the domestic 
economy remained in deep recession. The finan-
cial framework also remained unstable, with 
three-digit inflation which continued to rise, 
owing largely to faster devaluation and the 
increase in the prices of energy and public servi-
ces. The monetary programme restricted lend-
ing and increased interest rates in a desperate 
attempt to check the flight of capital and the 
transfer of liquid assets into dollars. These pro-
cesses were already stimulated not only by the 
general instability and the high relative profita-
bility of the dollar "but also by a degree of uncer-
tainty about the measures which the new 
government might take. 
In these circumstances ¡t was natural that 
private investment should remain depressed and 
that speculation and recession should continue. 
II 
Financial performance of enterprises in 1980-1985 
1. Purpose and method 
The purpose of this section is to examine the 
effect of the crisis on the financial performance 
of enterprises, using information obtained 
directly from their balances. A particular pur-
pose is to discover in what way the crisis affected 
the liquidity, borrowing, profitability and sol-
vency of the most important enterprises. 
The data on the financial performance of 
enterprises presented below are based on the 
audited balances submitted annually to the 
National Supervisory Commission for Compan-
ies and Securities (CONASEV) by major enter-
prises in various areas of activity. As these data 
had been published only in partial form and 
intermittently, it was necessary to obtain addi-
tional information directly from the CONASEV 
work sheets. 
The statistical value of this sample has some 
limitations owing to certain features of the data: 
the sample is biased towards the large enter-
prise; the structure by activity (table 6) differs 
from that of the country, and the size of the 
sample of enterprises has increased over time. 
(The number of enterprises submitting returns 
increased from 785 in 1980 to 2 010 in 1984.) 
However, the degree of cover of total sales has 
varied less: as a percentage of GDP, reported 
sales were 43% in 1980, 57% in 1982 and 48% 
in 1984; in the case of manufacturing enter-
Table 6 
PERU: PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN 
OF NET SALES, BY SECTOR, 




































Source: Based on data of the National Supervisory 
Commission for Companies and Securities 
(CONASEV). 
62 CEPAL REVIEW No. 32 / August ¡987 
prises, the sample increased from 19% of total 
GDP in 1980 to 2 3 % in 1982 and 2 1 % in 1984. 
In addition to these limitations, the data 
have another defect, the importance of which is 
impossible to establish; the non-truthfulness of 
the balances. Replying to a question about the 
real impact of the crisis on his lending bodies, a 
banker told me: "It is really very difficult to say, 
and I would never try to find out from the balan-
ces because they have nothing to do with the 
truth. The only thing I can do to verify the 
position of a businessman is to check the bor-
rowing ratio (debts to other banks reported by 
the Office of the Superintendent of Banks) and 
look him in the eyes". 
2. Liquidity 
During the period under study the liquid assets 
of the enterprises declined, but they managed to 
maintain a positive level of liquidity (table 7). 
The most important changes in the structure 
and composition of the liquidity of the enter-
prises were the following: 
a) In manufacturing enterprises current 
assets declined as a proportion of total assets. In 
1980 liquid assets made up 0.61 % of total assets, 
whereas in 1985 the figure was 0.50%, with a 
drop of 16.7%. Nevertheless, these enterprises 
managed to maintained a balanced liquidity posi-
tion by adjusting their short-term liabilities to 
changes in their liquid assets. Thus, the liquidity 
index (the ratio of current assets to current lia-
bilities: index 7.1 in table 7) remained positive 
and declined by only 5.9%, with its lowest level 
in 1983 (1.18). By 1985 the index had recovered 
to 1.28, similar to its pre-crisis level in 1982. The 
commercial enterprises were able to maintain 
greater stability in the management of their liq-
uidity owing to the nature of their activities, and 
the mining enterprises had positive levels in 
each year, despite the especially acute crisis, and 
Table 7 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF THE UQUIDITY OF ENTERPRISES, 1980-1985 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
a) Manufacturing enterprises 
7.1 Liquidity index 
7.2 Cash liquidity 
7.3 Cash-bank turnround (number of days) 
7.4 Accounts receivable turnround (number of days) 
7.5 Current assets/total assets 
7.6 Assets in hand and at bank/total assets 
b) Commercial enterprises 
7.1 Liquidity index 
7.2 Cash liquidity 
7.3 Cash-bank turnround (number of days) 
7.4 Accounts receivable turnround (number of days) 
7.5 Current assets/total assets 
7.6 Assets in hand and at bank/total assets 
c) Mining enterprises 
7.1 Liquity index 
7.2 Cash liquidity 
7.3 Cash-bank turnround (number of days) 
7.4 Accounts receivable turnround (number of days) 
7.5 Current assets/total assets 













































































































Source: National Supervisory Commission for Companies and Securities (CONASEV). 
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even achieved a surprising increase in their liq-
uidity index in 1985. 
b) The slower rate of turn-round of accounts 
receivable (accounts receivable as a proportion 
of sales: index 7.4) was a major problem for the 
enterprises, but they offset it with a slower turn-
round of accounts payable. Thus, the average 
collection period increased in manufacturing 
from 71 to 91 days between 1982 and 1983 and 
then declined to 74 days in 1984 and to only 64 
days in 1985. 
c) On the other hand, the increasing profita-
bility of very liquid financial instruments, in 
particular bank certificates in foreign currency 
(table 8), meant that the enterprises tried to 
maintain their liquidity in a more profitable 
form, i.e., cash in hand and at bank, in particular 
by delaying settlement of their accounts payable. 
Thus, in the manufacturing sector the ratio of 
resources in hand and at bank to sales (multip-
lied by 360: index 7.3) increased from 11 days in 
1980 to 27 days in 1982 and continued to rise to 
34 days in 1984. The same thing happened in 
commerce and mining. Paradoxically, therefore, 
the enterprises maintained a higher balance in 
hand and at bank during the years of crisis than 
before (table 7, indices 7.3 and 7.6). The 
CONASEV statistics do not distinguish between 
types of bank deposit, but the information 
obtained in interviews and the sharp increase in 
the total deposits in foreign currency at the 
national level confirm that the increased amount 
of cash at bank was mostly invested in foreign 
currency. 
d) The performance of the mining enter-
prises was similar to that of manufacturing, but 
with greater variation of their liquidity indices 
and with smaller immediately available balances 
in hand and at bank (index 7.6). 
3. Asseis turnover 
The assets turnover (ratio of total sales to total 
assets) can be used as an indicator of changes in 
output and installed capacity, although it does 
not indicate the absolute level of use of installed 
capacity. 
In the commercial sector the assets turnover 
remained stable, but this was not the case in 
manufacturing (table 9)- In manufacturing 
(index 9.2) the ratio tended to decline up to 1983 
Table 8 
PERU: REAL FINANCIAL PROFITS 








































































































































































Source: Based on data of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru 
(BCRP). 
"Deflated by the cost of living. 
Does not include tax on interest. 
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and to recover in 1984-1985. The fall in 1983 
occurred despite the maintenance of inventory 
levels during that year owing to the rapidity of 
the decline in sales (index 9.1)- The reaction 
seemed to set in from 1984 when the average 
level of inventories began to fall. This decline 
also meant that the increased assets turnover 
from 1984 was achieved without greater use of 
installed capacity. 
It is interesting to see that in the manufac-
turing and commercial enterprises gross profit 
margins on sales were maintained despite the 
smaller turnover (table 10, index 10.1, and table 
9, index 9-2). The gross profit on sales managed 
to absorb the increase in fixed costs within the 
average operating costs (table 10). 
It is concluded that the increase in fixed costs 
was absorbed by the reduction in variable costs, 
such as labour, and by the fall in the relative 
prices of certain components. In the case of 
labour, this is confirmed by the sharp decline in 
the index of real wages and salaries in enter-
prises employing 16 or more workers in Lima: 
real average earnings fell by 26% between the 
mid-points of 1980-1982 and 1983 and by a 
further 19% between 1983 and 1985 (table 11). 
It is also possible that the lower prices of certain 
agricultural products, such as timber, sugar and 
meat, also contributed to the reduction of varia-
ble costs. 
The commercial sector also maintained a 
very stable gross profit margin on sales through-
out the period. 
4. Solvency 
An enterprise's solvency is its capacity to meet 
its obligations, which also implies a degree of 
financial independence and borrowing capacity. 
The main conclusion to be drawn from the 
summary of the management and solvency indi-
ces (table 9) is that, with the exception of min-
ing, the crisis did not increase the enterprises' 
debt levels. Moreover, the ratio of net worth to 
Table 9 
PERU: MANAGEMENT AND SOLVENCY INDICES OF ENTERPRISES, 1980-1985 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
a) Manufacturing enterprises 
9.1 Holding of stocks (number of days) 
9.2 Total assets turnover 
9.3 Long-term net worth borrowing 
9.4 Borrowing/assets 
9.5 Leverage 
9.6 Net worth guarantee 
b) Commercial enterprises 
9.1 Holding of stocks (number of days) 
9.2 Total assets turnover 
9.3 Long-term net worth borrowing 
9.4 Borrowing/assets 
9.5 Leverage 
9.6 Net worth guarantee 
c) Mining enterprises 
9.1 Holding of stocks (number of days) 
92 Total assets turnover 
9.3 Long-term net worth borrowing 
9-4 Borrowing/assets 
9.5 Leverage 













































































































Source: National Supervisory Commission for Companies and Securities (CONASEV). 
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Table 10 
PERU: PROFIT INDICES, 1980-1985 
a) Manufacturing enterprises 
10.1 Gross margin/sales 
10.2 Gross profits/net worth 
10.3 Gross profits/assets 
10.4 Net profits/sales 
10.5 Administrative costs/total earnings 
10.6 Financial costs/total earnings 
10.7 Operating costs/total earnings 
b) Commercial enterprises 
10.1 Gross margin/sales 
10.2 Gross profits/net worth 
10.3 Gross profits/assets 
10.4 Net profits/sales 
10.5 Administrative costs/total earnings 
10.6 Financial costs/total earnings 
10.7 Operating costs/total earnings 
c) Mining enterprises 
10.1 Gross margin/sales 
10.2 Gross profits/net worth 
10.3 Gross profits/assets 
10.4 Net profits/sales 
10.5 Administrative costs/total earnings 
10.6 Financial costs/total earnings 
10.7 Operating costs/total earnings 































































































































Source: National Supervisory Commission for Companies and Securities (CONASEV). 
debt tended to improve in the manufacturing 
sector. Thus, the operating leverage (total liabil-
ities to net worth: index 9-5) in this sector 
declined from 1.55 in 1980 to 1.03'in 1985, and 
the ratio of long-term debt to net worth (index 
9.3) fell even further. On the other hand, the 
ratio of total assets to total liabilities (index 9-4) 
remained stable throughout the period 1980-
1985. The difference between the behaviour of 
total debt and leverage is due to the fact that the 
leverage was favoured by the positive perfor-
mance of the net worth. The high level of fixed 
assets and their upward revaluation protected 
the net worth against inflation. The resulting 
increase in net worth helped to prevent any 
increase in the leverage index. 
The financing of the enterprises was basi-
cally short-term throughout the period (indices 
9.3 and 9.5), reflecting both the unavailability of 
long-term credit and the reduced investment in 
plant and equipment. 
In 1984, after the sharp decline in sales 
(16.8%) in 1983, the enterprises were not dis-
posed to increase their output, preferring to run 
down their stocks. The uncertainty was so great 
that they even preferred not to make invest-
ments in labour and repairs and other minor 
operating investments. 
5. Profitability 
The gross profit margin (table 10, index 10.1) 
indicates sales profits, after the cost of sales has 
been deducted, as a measure of the capacity to 
meet necessary operating costs, such as financial 
and labour costs, taxes, etc. 
The gross profit margin remained almost 
constant throughout the period under study, des-
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pite the fact that the increase in sales operating 
costs (index 10.7) was higher than the increase 
in operating income. Financial costs accounted 
for an increasing proportion of operating costs 
as a result of the increase in nominal interest 
rates. Between 1982 and 1984 operating profits 
—the difference between the gross margin and 
operating costs (indices 10.1 and 10.7)— were 
negative. 
Despite this negative level of operating 
profits, the enterprises made profits from the 
management of their liquid assets. 
6. Evolution of the performance 
of the enterprises by period 
If the performance of the manufacturing and 
commercial enterprises is considered in terms of 
their response to the macroeconomic context, 
the following subperiods can be distinguished: 
Table 11 






































































Source: National Supervisory Commission forCompanies 
and Securities (CONASEV). 
(1) Ministry of Labour and Social Advancement, 
Survey of Establishments with 16 or more 
workers. 
(2) Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP): fiscal 
sector, based on data of the Ministry of the Econ-
omy and Finance (excludes bonuses). 
(4) Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP): income 
and product. Based on Consumer Price index data 
(1979 = 100) of the National Institute of Statistics. 
Average of domestic service wages, prices of shoe 
repair services, tailoring and other informal sector 
services. 
a) January 1980 to June 1982: Although 
there was some dynamism in the sales of the 
manufacturing enterprises, the availability of 
idle capacity reduced the need for investment in 
plant and equipment. 
The sales of the commercial enterprises 
were more dynamic, partly owing to the sharp 
increase in exports which was reflected in 
greater use of installed capacity and higher bor-
rowing. The mining enterprises, despite the fall 
in mineral prices, continued with their medium-
term investment plans. 
b)]uly 1982 to end of 1983: There was a 
general decline in sales in both commercial and 
manufacturing enterprises and major changes in 
the management of their liquid assets. The 
enterprises tried to maintain a greater propor-
tion of their assets in financial investments by 
delaying settlement of their obligations to the 
State, their suppliers and the banking system. 
The reduction in sales meant less use of installed 
capacity and declining profits. 
c) 1984-1985: The profit indices of the 
enterprises recovered and there was some 
improvement in sales, which was absorbed more 
by a reduction of inventories than by higher 
output. They continued to use financial invest-
ment instruments in the management of their 
liquidity. 
7. Evolution of profits: 
the manufacturing sector 
The evolution of the income and expenditure of 
the manufacturing sector will now be considered 
for the critical period 1981-1985 on the basis of 
the balances submitted to CONASEV (table 12). 
The situation is analysed at three points: the 
second half of 1981, a moderately prosperous 
stage preceding the crisis; the second half of 
1983, the time of deepest recession; and the first 
half of 1985, following two years of adjustment. 
The most striking point is that, despite a fall 
of 23% in the real value of sales, net profits 
remained positive, although declining to only a 
quarter of their earlier level. Furthermore, profit 
levels recovered rapidly and for the first half of 
1985 almost equalled the absolute amount of 
profits in 1981, although sales remained 11% 
lower than in 1981. Accordingly, the net profit 
per unit of sales in 1985 (5.3%) exceeded the 
1981 level (4.8%). 
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Table 12 
PERU: PROFITS OF MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES, 1981-1985 

























































Source: Prepared on the basis of data from the reports of the National Supervisory Commission for Companies and Securities 
(CONASEV). 
The crisis impaired the profit margin by 
increasing the fixed costs per unit of sales and 
the financial costs through a higher nominal 
interest rate. The effect of fixed costs was 
reflected mainly under the heading "Other 
costs", which increased from 16.4 to 196% of 
sales between 1981(11) and 1983(11). Financial 
costs rose even more: from 7.2 to 14.2% of sales. 
In all, these factors increased the cost per unit of 
sales by 10.2 percentage points. 
The compensatory factors were reflected 
primarily in the decline in variable costs or 
"Sales costs" from 70.4 to 66.6% between 
1981(11) and 1983(H)- As was stated above, the 
enterprises benefitted from a sharp reduction in 
real wages and some reduction in the relative 
prices of certain current inputs. In the case of 
wages, the reduction was sufficient to influence 
the average cost, despite their small impact on 
total costs. The decline in real wages offset in 
part the obstacles to manpower cuts created by 
the Labour Stability Law (although this law had 
given the enterprises a degree of flexibility dur-
ing the three-year trial period before workers 
acquired tenure). As to the other inputs, between 
1981 and 1983 the terms of trade improved by 
11.5% in favour of industry (table 13). 
The tax burden per unit of sales also 
declined. Part of this movement was reflected 
under the heading "Taxes", which fell from 5.2 
to 4.3% in the first period and then 4.0% in 
1985(1). With respect to the other taxes counted 
as sales costs, it must be assumed that they also 
showed a reduction, at least in payments made, 
for the government's total revenue declined by 
28% in real terms between 1981 and 1983. Much 
of this reduction took the form of arrears and 
delays on the part of taxpayers, who in Peru are 
almost all enterprises. 
The increase in the financial income of the 
enterprises also contributed to the maintenance 
of profit levels. This was due to the payment of 
higher nominal interest rates on their deposits 
and even more to the gains made by them as 
holders of liquid assets in foreign currency. As 
Table 13 




















































Source: Agriculture: Sectoral Statistical Office of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
"Implicit deflator of the value added in manufacturing 
divided by the GDP deflator. Based on data of the 
National Institute of Statistics (1NE), Cuentas Nacionales 
del Perú, 1950-1985, September 1985, tables 4 and 5. 
Price index based on a basket of 15 products and deflated 
by the cost of living index. 
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was seen in the previous section, the enterprises 
maintained their liquidity throughout the crisis 
—a fact incompatible with a sharp decline in 
sales— owing to the high return on the liquid 
assets maintained in foreign currency. Between 
the end of 1981 and June 1985 the average real 
return on foreign currency deposits was 2 3 % 
(table 8). And it is probable that the decline in 
sales costs also reflected, in the form of capital 
gains on the movement of inventories, a finan-
cial profit resulting from the difference between 
the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate, 
which thus offset the greater burden of financial 
costs. 
The net effect on profits can be seen in 
table 12. The margin of operating profits moved 
into the red under the first impact of the crisis, 
then fell from 2% in 1981(1) to -4.7% in 
1983(H); however, this was offset by the 
increased financial income. The net profit per 
unit of sales remained positive, although falling 
from 4.8 to 1.6%. The continual reduction in 
operating and tax costs, and even a certain reduc-
tion in fixed costs per unit of sales shown under 
"Other costs", produced a full recovery in net 
profits for 1985(1). The net profit margin of 
5.3% in 1985(1) also exceeded the level of 4 .8% 
recorded in 1981(11). This recovery was com-
bined with a partial normalization of sales, 
which increased total 1985 profits to their pre-
crisis level. 
The results were similar in the commercial 
enterprises (table 14). 
Table 14 
PERU: COMMERCIAL SECTOR: 
FINANCIAL EARNINGS AND 
PROFITABILITY OF THE 
COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES, 
1980-1985 








































Source: National Supervisory Commission for Companies 
and Securities (CONASEV). 
Ill 
An interpretation 
1. The hypothesis 
The starting point for this consideration of the 
financial experience of the enterprises in 1980-
1985 is the crisis of production and foreign debt 
which the country underwent. The analysis is 
expected to show whether there was a compara-
ble and parallel crisis in the financial situation of 
the enterprises. 
Several elements combined in the crisis 
affecting the enterprises during this period. The 
most important was the sudden collapse of sales 
between June 1982 and December 1983. The 
drop was 2 2 % in real terms in the private non-
farm sector; it was probably even greater in 
modern-sector enterprises owing to the increase 
in informal and illegal activities in the economy. 
Business finances were struck another blow 
by the faster rate of devaluation; after three years 
of decline (33% between December 1978 and 
June 1982) the real exchange rate began to climb, 
increasing by 19% during the next 18 months. 
This made the considerable foreign-currency 
debt incurred by the enterprises since 1980 more 
expensive: in two and a half years the foreign-
currency debt (direct and endorsed) increased by 
144% and at the end of 1982 it represented 51 % 
of the total short-term debt of the enterprises 
(table 15). However, most of this foreign-
currency borrowing did not form part of the 
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Table 15 
PERU: SHORT-TERM PRIVATE SECTOR DEBT, 1974-1985 



























































































































































































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP), Monetary Seaor Division. 
aN/C = National currency, 
6F/C — Foreign currency, valued at the exchange rate at the end of the period. 
country's external debt but was financed by 
means of dollars kept in the country in the form 
of bank certificates in foreign currency. 
The initial effect of the faster devaluation in 
1983 included a psychological factor: the deva-
luation rate doubled in nominal terms in the first 
months of 1983 from an annual rate of 72% in 
1982 to 140% in the first half of 1983. The real 
increase was actually much less because inflation 
also doubled, but for much of the year the out-
look seemed alarming to businessmen burdened 
by an increasing dollar debt. 
At the same time businessmen began to feel 
the effects of the restrictive monetary policy: 
real lending to the private sector in local cur-
rency declined by 21% between June 1982 and 
the end of 1983- Moreover, the credit restrictions 
were aggravated by the external financial crisis: 
the level of external short-term borrowing, 
including endorsed loans, declined by 26% from 
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a maximum of US$3 028 million at the end of 
1982 to US$2 238 million in the first quarter of 
1984. Part of this reduction was probably volun-
tary, as a response to the faster devaluation, but 
the cutback in lending to Peru by the interna-
tional banking system must also have made a 
contribution. 
As was to be expected, the combined effect of 
these factors produced a serious financial crisis 
in the enterprises. Their cash flow suffered the 
simultaneous effects of the decline in sales, tigh-
ter credit and larger financial payments on the 
dollar debt. Profits were affected by the reduced 
capital turnover and the high level of fixed costs, 
which included part of the labour costs owing to 
the rigidity of Peru's Labour Stability Law. And 
the decline in profits and the increase in the 
burden of foreign-currency debt undermined the 
solvency of the enterprises. 
2. The results 
The information presented in the previous sec-
tion indicates that the enterprises were less 
affected by the crisis than might reasonably have 
been expected. There were few bankruptcies 
(some timber companies, some companies 
linked to a bank which failed) and a few tempor-
ary shut-downs. The survival rate was high, at 
least in the modern sector of the economy. 
The performance of the financial indices 
presented in section II confirms this picture of 
survival. The liquidity index declined but with-
out becoming negative, and one of its compo-
nents (cash and bank liquidity) even increased. 
In the majority of activities current liabilities 
increased as a percentage of sales between 1981 
and 1983, but then declined in 1984-1985. In 
1985 the level of short-term debt was lower than 
in 1981 in manufacturing, commerce, transport 
and services (table 16). Leverage declined in 
manufacturing and mining and remained rela-
tively stable in commerce. Under the combined 
impact of smaller capital turnover and larger 
financial costs, including the foreign exchange 
losses due to devaluation, operating profits were 
negative throughout the period 1982-1985 
(table 14). However, total profits were pro-
tected by increasing financial earnings which, 
between 1982 and 1985, more than exceeded the 
operating losses and enabled the manufacturing 
and commercial sectors, for example, to record 
positive net profits even in 1983, the worst year 
of the crisis. 
3. The defence mechanisms 
The survival of the enterprises was due to their 
own defence mechanisms, help from the govern-
ment and the eventual recovery of the economy. 
The most important defence mechanisms as 
such seem to have been the successful transfer of 
the necessary adjustment to other parts of the 
Table 16 
PERU: CURRENT LIABILITIES BY SECTOR OF ACTIVITY, 1980-1985 







































































Source: National Supervisory Commission for Companies and Securities (CONASEV). 
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economy and the financial gains made by the 
enterprises. 
These gains offset the operating losses of 
1982 to 1985 with large financial earnings 
which, in the case of industry, amounted to 6% 
of the value of sales in 1984 and, in the case of 
commerce, 4% of this value in 1983-1985 
(table 14). 
The opportunity to make these gains was 
created by the strong and persistent distortion of 
the financial market from 1982 and, in particu-
lar, by the high absolute profits derived from 
foreign-currency holdings. During the three 
years from March 1982 to March 1985 foreign-
currency profits averaged 20% in real terms. In 
contrast, holdings of local currency invested at 
the highest market interest rate had a negative 
profit rate of 26%. Foreign exchange holdings, 
therefore, were the safest and on average most 
profitable investment for several years. 
The importance of financial investments 
during this period can be measured by the value 
of the foreign currency deposits in the banking 
system. These deposits increased from US$592 
million at the end of 1979 to a maximum of 
US$1 680 million in March 1985. As a propor-
tion of total quasi-money this value increased 
from 38 to 72%. Some of these deposits were 
made by natural persons and some by the State, 
but it is estimated that private enterprises held 
between 60 and 70% of the total. Enterprises 
also held deposits abroad, as well as other securi-
ties in foreign currency. Thus, the financial 
losses suffered by foreign currency borrowers 
were offset by speculative gains, at least in the 
business sector as a whole. 
Businessmen tried hard to obtain the liquid-
ity to enable them to transfer their debt from 
dollars or to invest in foreign currencies. This 
quest for liquidity often had a recessive effect, 
especially when it meant reduced inventories, 
deferred investments and even the postpone-
ment of purchases and contracts necessary to the 
production cycle. 
The enterprises also protected themselves 
by transferring the necessary adjustment to oth-
ers. In 1983, for example, tax revenue declined 
by 31 % in real terms over the previous year. An 
IMF mission thought that the government had 
permitted a "collapse" of the tax administration. 
In fact, many of the enterprises had no other 
choice; the involuntary reduction of the tax 
burden from 17.6% of GDP in 1982 to 14.2% in 
1983 meant a transfer of 3.4% of the gross 
domestic product from the State to the 
enterprises. 
The workers also absorbed part of the 
adjustment: average wages and salaries in urban 
areas fell by between 20 and 30% from 1982 
(table 11). The reduction mechanism was 
mainly the market, but the wages policy, which 
was designed to check big raises in order to 
reduce inflation and the fiscal deficit, probably 
helped to weaken the labour sector's defences. It 
is more difficult to assess the role played by 
manpower cuts. There was certainly more flexi-
bility than is implied by the Labour Stability Law, 
which permitted the dismissal of workers who 
had not completed three years of service. Furth-
ermore, businessmen used the purchase of 
retirement pensions, persuasion and other 
methods to reduce their workforce. 
The transfer of the adjustment to the 
workers was also an automatic result of mecha-
nisms such as piecework, commission work and 
other forms of payment which tied the worker's 
income to his output or to sales. 
Table 17 
PERU: DOUBTFUL DEBT PORTFOLIO OF 
THE COMMERCIAL BANKING SISTEM 


























































Source; Office of the Superintendent of Banks and 
Insurance Companies. 
"Preliminary data to September. 
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Table 18 
PERU: DOUBTFUL DEBT PORTFOLIO WITH THE COUNTRY'S 
CREDIT SYSTEM, DECEMBER 1985 
(Millions of tntis) 
Number 
Unsecured loans 
Loans in arrears 
Legal collection 
Total doubtful portfolio 
Total portfolio 





1 561 499 
2 314 073 












5 654 001 
22 880 227 
24.7 
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Banks and Insurance Companies. 
Part of the adjustment was also transferred 
to the banks, a fact which contributed to the 
failure of three of them in 1983- 1984 (table 17 
and 18). The banks' total bad debts increased 
each year from 1980, rising from only 1.9% of 
the total investments of the banking system in 
1980 to 17.9% in 1985. In the end the Central 
Bank absorbed part of these bad debts, for it 
made support loans to several banks and had to 
guarantee the deposits of the banks which 
closed. 
Lastly, it is possible that a part of the adjust-
ment was transferred to the primary sector 
through a decline in the relative prices of raw 
materials. This is suggested by the index of real 
prices in the farming sector, which was 9% 
lower in 1983-1985 than in 1980-1982 
(table 13). 
Another source of aid for business was the 
government, mainly through the heavy subsidy 
implicit in the negative interest rates (table 19). 
In 1983 20.9% of the national currency debt was 
"liquidated" by the rates in force, and in 1985 the 
subsidy amounted to 18.6%. In all over the three 
years half of the 1982 debt was liquidated. 
The monetary authorities deliberately 
sought to liquídate the debt. This meant aban-
doning, the policy of real interest rates intro-
duced with great political difficulty in 1981 and 
caused a disagreement with the IMF which con-
tributed to the collapse of the standby loan 
agreement signed in 1983. 
A second instrument used by the govern-
ment to support business in this period was 
refinancing loans, which between 1983 and 1985 
represented roughly 0.7% of the gross domestic 
product (table 20). It is probable that most of 
these loans were intended for the transfer of 
debt from dollars or the purchase of foreign 
currency. 
However, notwithstanding these special 
refinancing loans the fairly tight monetary pol-
icy pursued during 1983-1985 led to a contrac-
tion of real lending. At the same time, the 
Table 19 
PERU: EFFECT OF NEGATIVE REAL 
INTEREST RATES ON OPERATIONS 
IN NATIONAL CURRENCY 













































Source: Based on data of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru 
(BCRP). 
"Refers to total deposits in the national currency. 
Refers to total investments in the national currency. 
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Table 20 4. Final comments 
PERU: SUPPORT LOANS TO BANKS AND 
ENTERPRISES GRANTED BY THE 
CENTRAL RESERVE BANK, 
19824984 










































































Source; Based on data of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru 
(BCRP). 
increase in the inflation rate speeded up the 
circulation of money and also contributed to the 
contraction of lending in real terms. Lastly, the 
large loans made to the government in 1985 to 
cover the deficit caused by the fall in revenue 
reduced the availability of credit for the private 
sector. The combined effect of these factors 
caused a sharp decline in the supply of credit in 
soles to the private sector: between June 1982 
and March 1985 this sector's debt in local cur-
rency fell by 34% in real terms (table 15). 
Accordingly, Central Bank loans acquired much 
greater importance in the total flow of credit to 
the private sector (from 6% in 1980-1982 to 
14.9% in 1983-1984), but they could not check 
the adverse effects of the factors mentioned 
above (table 21). Moreover, this cutback in lend-
ing had the opposite effect to that produced by 
other government measures, for it obliged the 
enterprises to make a larger adjustment. 
The social cost of the crisis for the enterprises 
took the form of losses of investment and even 
of productive capacity, and the lack of mainte-
nance rendered equipment useless. For three 
years the net investment of the private sector 
was no more than 3 or 4% of GDP. Businessmen 
protected themselves by means of the flight of 
capital, which contributed to the balance-of-
payments crisis. The errors and omissions in this 
balance increased from an annual positive 
amount of 2.4% of GDP in 1980-1982 to a crisis 
level of -3-4% of GDP in 1983-1985. Further-
more, a disproportionate part of the adjustment 
was transferred to the workers. Some non-
tenured workers lost their jobs and those with 
tenure suffered a heavy loss of purchasing 
power. Incomes also declined sharply m the 
informal sector (table 11). Part of the adjust-
ment was absorbed by the population as a whole 
by means of the inflationary financing of the 
fiscal deficit created by the non-payment of taxes 
and the protection of bank deposits. Inflation 
had a particularly damaging effect on savers who 
were not protected by assets in foreign currency. 
The greatest damage, however, resulted 
from the recessionary multiplier effect of the 
Table 21 
PERU; REAL INVESTMENTS, 
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 
OF COMMERCIAL AND 
INVESTMENT BANKS 













































Source: Office of the Superindendent of Banks and 
Insurance Companies. 
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defensive reactions of businessmen exacerbated 
by the great distortion in the financial market. 
This tendency to react by cutting back had been 
strengthened by the business experience of the 
1970s and it aggravated the recession: the enter-
prises achieved a degree of financial balance but 
at lower levels of production, investment, wages 
and total demand. Not only did demand-led pro-
duction not recover after the collapse in 1983, it 
even fell by 2% between 1983 and the first half 
of 1985, while production determined by the 
climate and the external demand increased by 
17.3% in the same period. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the financial 
experience of the enterprises during the crisis 
period under consideration contained a paradox: 
although they withstood the crisis with surpris-
ing success, their survival mechanisms had a 
high social cost and probably helped to aggravate 
the global crisis. 
